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restrictions should not be so onerous as to reduce the effectiveness of collection
in situations that demand expeditiousness; yet the Government should not be
given the power to destroy a taxpayer financially at its unfettered discretion.
The instant decision also serves to impede the evolution of the tax code into
an adjunct of the criminal law. If it is to retain its legitimacy, the taxation
function must not become ancillary to criminal prosecution.

STEvE J. WOLK

NEGLIGENCE: AGGRAVATION-OF INJURIES BY -MALPRACTICECONTRIBUTION OR- INDEMNITY?
Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187 (4th-D.C.A. Fla. 1974)
Suit was brought against an automobile rental corporation and a driver
for injuries resulting from an automobile accident. Plaintiffs charged the defendants with liability for both the original injury and its aggravation caused
by negligent treatment by a physician.1 Defendants then filed a third party
complaint against the physician for indemnification. A motion to dismiss the
third party complaint was denied by the trial court, and the physician filed a
Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 19296 (6th Cir. 1974) ($52,680.25); Boyd
v. United States, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 19408 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ($13,693.30); Johnston v. Schmidt, 74-1
U.S.T.C. g9321 (S.D. Cal. 1974) ($10,044.75); Willits v. Richardson, 362 F. Supp. 456, 73-2
U.S.T.C. ff9602 (S.D. Fla. 1973) ($25,549.00); Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398, 73-1
U.S.T.C. 119299 (D. Ariz. 1973) ($100,000.00); Rambo v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 1021, 73-1
U.S.T.C. 19244 (W.D. Ky. 1972) ($28,446.88); Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171, 72-1
U.S.T.C. 19233 (N.D. Tex. 1972) ($104,697.20). This misplacement of the legal mandate
sustaining jeopardy procedure has prompted misgivings even within the IRS. During the
1974 Hearings on Taxpayer Assistance, S. B. Wolfe, Director of the Audit Division of IRS,
stated: "In our review of termination of taxable period cases . . . we are concerned about
the emphasis being placed upon depriving the narcotics traffickers of their working capital
as opposed to the emphasis that should be placed on enforcing the tax laws against them."
Hearingson Taxpayer Assistance, supra note 20, at 622.
It has also been suggested that §6851, as interpreted by the IRS, denies the taxpayer
equal protection of the law. With no discernible basis for a distinction, the Government's
view results in denial of prompt post.seizure review to short-year jeopardy taxpayers although other jeopardy taxpayers are entitled to petition the Tax Court within sixty days
of the assessment. Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1281,-69-2 U.S.T.C. 19541, at

85,490 (D. Md. 1969).
1. In the course of an operation necessitated by injuries sustained in an automobile
accident, the physician caused the plaintiff neurological damage through negligent severance
of her carotid artery. 302 So. 2d 187 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1974).
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petition for certiorari.2 The Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida denied
certiorari and HELD, a tortfeasor initially causing an injury has the right to
indemnification from a physician for aggravation of the injury in the course of
treatment.
Fundamental to the law of torts is the principle that a person is held responsible for all the consequences of his tortious conduct. 4 According to this
rule, the original injury caused by a tortfeasor is considered to be the proximate cause of the damages flowing from subsequent unskillful treatment by a
physician.5 Adherence to this principle results in placing an inequitable
burden of the entire loss on the initial wrongdoer. Courts have long sought to
find a just resolution of the problem through the doctrines of contribution and
indemnity.6
Based on equitable principles, contribution seeks to distribute the loss incurred by joint tortfeasors where one of them has paid an unjust proportion
of the burden7 Usually, for contribution to be available, there must be common liability of joint tortfeasors predicated on concert of action, or alternatively, the concurrent, independent acts of the tortfeasors must result in a
single, indivisible injury.8 Further, a rule denying contribution among tortfeasors, that originated in England and later was adopted by American courts,9
was based on the policy that the law should not encourage tortious conduct
among wrongdoers by allowing restitution to one at fault,10 or make value

2. Certiorari was the appropriate method of review here because no appeal was allowed
from the interlocutory order of the circuit court dismissing the third party complaint. The
court entertained jurisdiction, reasoning that petitioners could be materially injured throughout the remainder of the proceedings and be without adequate remedy if the order were
given erroneously. Id. at 189.
3. Td.
4. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co., Ltd. [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.
1961) (N.S.W.) ("Wagon Mound No. 1").
5. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Corp. v. Richardson, 105 Fla. 204, 210, 141 So. 133, 135 (1932).
6. An additional theory on which relief has been granted in this situation is subrogation.
Based on the premise that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover against the physician,
subrogation to the plaintiff's rights has been permitted in an action by the original tortfeasor
against the physician. Clark v. Halstead, 276 App. Div. 17, 93 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1949); Fisher v.
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co.. 173 Wis. 57, 180 N.W. 269 (1929).
7. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962). The Wisconsin court rejected the customary method of determining the amount of shares for contribution according
to the number of tortfeasors, concluding that equity is best served by assigning liability in
proportion to the percentage of causal negligence attributable to each tortfeasor. Id. at 4,
114 N.W.2d at 107.
8. Bost v. Metcalfe, 219 N.C. 607, 610, 14 S.E.2d 648, 651 (1941).
9. This rule was first introduced in the decision of Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep.
186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). Although the principle set forth there was limited only
to the commission of intentional and wilful torts, it was misinterpreted in America to include unintentional or negligent torts as well. See Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662, 666 (D.C.
Cir. 1949); Ellis v. Chicago 9: N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 403, 167 N.W. 1048, 1052 (1918):
Comment, Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 43 Miss. L.J. 670, 671 (1972).
10. See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 39 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 31 MONT. L. REv. 69, 71 (1969).
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judgments of the relative culpability of tortfeasors.", Finding these reasons to
be outweighed by the disadvantages of such an inflexible and inequitable
rule,' 2 approximately half of all American jurisdictions have eliminated the
rule against contribution. 3 Even where the rule is still in force, courts have
created exceptions in order to allow recovery in certain circumstances.' 4 But,
relief is granted under such exceptions only where the tortfeasors are both
liable to the injured party but are not in pari delicto as to each other. 15 Generally, in situations where recovery is allowed, the negligence of one tortfeasor
so exceeds that of another that one is deemed active and the other passive, 16
and the party primarily at fault is required to pay the full amount of
damages.' 7
The present state of confusion surrounding the doctrines of contribution
and indemnity developed when the courts, in an effort to circumvent the rule
against contribution, created exceptions to the rule, categorized them as
indemnity, and essentially equated the two theories.'8 In fact, indemnity is
similar to contribution only in that it permits reimbursement for a loss paid
by one party on behalf of another. 19 Its orgins were in contract law, however,
and a contract, express or implied, was required in order to be secured against
loss. 20 Thus, indemnity, unlike contribution, involves a shifting of the entire

11. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382,
386 (1972); Note, supra note 10, at 71.
12. For a discussion of the argument against the no-contribution rule, see Jones, Contribution Among Tortfeasors,11 U. FLA. L. REv. 175 (1958).
13. This result has been accomplished by different means in the various states. The
Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, drafted in 1939 and modified in 1955, has
been adopted in some states, while others passed their own laws allowing contribution. Coccia,
Getting Others To Assume or Share the Loss: A Discussion of Indemnity and Contribution,
17 TRIAL LAWYER's GuIDE 179, 188 (1973). The courts have also been responsible for rejection of the rule in some states. Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048

(1918).
14. E.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143
So. 316 (1932) (breach of duty); Fincher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1963) (vicarious liability); McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 374, 185 S.E. 873 (1936) (masterservant relationship).
15. E.g., Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 196 U.S. 217 (1905); United
States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954); Stembler v.
Smith, 242 So. 2d 472 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d
45 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1963), modified, 160 So. 2d 102 (1964).
16. Maybarduk v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Peoples Gas Sys.,
Inc. v. B. & P. Restaurant Corp., 271 So. 2d 804 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 166 So. 2d 211 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
17. Pincher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672, 674 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
18. E.g., Panasuk v. Seaton, 277 F. Supp. 979 (D. Mont. 1968); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932); Stembler v. Smith, 242
So. 2d 472 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 166 So. 2d
211 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
19. E.g., Mims Crane Serv., Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1969); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 166 So. 2d 211 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
20. Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Mines Crane Serv., Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836, 839 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
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burden according to the agreement.2 1 Furthermore, contribution requires that
the parties be equally at fault; whereas one seeking indemnification must
prove himself to be totally without personal fault.2 - Despite their established
differences, courts have tended to interchange these doctrines, 23 muddling
them beyond the possibility of maintaining a rational distinction.
The confusion is caused primarily by the difficulty in classifying the fault
of the tortfeasors, a process that is necessary to the determination of the appropriate theory of relief to be invoked: either the exception to the rule
against contribution or the indemnity doctrine.2-4 Technically, the distinction
is that the contribution exception requires that fault of the wrongdoers be
varied in degree,25 whereas indemnity demands that their negligence be of a
different characterso that, although theoretically both parties are liable, only
2
one has actually committed a wrongful act.

The subtleties involved in determining whether the fault differs in degree
or kind are best illustrated by the situations in which the issue arises. The
problem occurs most frequently when one person is held liable for the damages
actually caused by the actions of another. For example, vicarious liability,
imputed on the basis of a legal relationship of principal and agent27 or employer and employee 2 8 is merely a legal fiction that imposes responsibility on
the individual required to pay the loss. Similarly, where the breach of a duty
or agreement between wrongdoers is the proximate cause of the injury incurred by the plaintiff, the party held liable is generally only guilty of omission to act.2 9 In these situations the question arises whether there is any negli21. Transcon Lines v. Barnes, 17 Ariz. App. 428, 435, 498 P.2d 502, 509 (1972); Herrero
v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); see Note,
supra note 10, at 69.
22. E.g., Transcon Lines v. Barnes, 17 Ariz. App. 428, 498 P.2d 502 (1972); Stembler v.
Smith, 242 So. 2d 472 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Aircraft Taxi Co. v. Perkins, 227 So. 2d 722
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969). But see Grand Union Co. v. Prudential Bldg. Maintenance Corp., 226
So. 2d 117 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 166 So. 2d 211
(Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
23. E.g., Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316
(1932); Maybarduk v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Gertz v. Campbell,
55 Ill. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973).
24. E.g., United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709, 714-15 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
975 (1954); Herero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964);
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932);
Maybarduk v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374, 376-77 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
25. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So.
316 (1932).
26. Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 336 Pa. 322, 325, 77 A.2d 368, 370 (1951).
27. Fincher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963) (liability of
negligent driver imputed to owner).
28. United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954); McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 473, 185 S.E. 873 (1936) (employer liable for negligent acts of
his employee).
29. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So.
316 (1932); Grand Union Co. v. Prudential Bldg. Maintenance Corp., 226 So. 2d 117 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 166 So. 2d 211 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1964).
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gence on the part of an individual that warrants imposition of liability and, if
so, whether there is a sufficient quantitative difference in fault between tortfeasors to render them not in pari delicto. Admittedly, this fine technical
distinction poses a problem to courts confronted with a particular factual
situation. Courts have shown little concern about this danger, however, frequently fusing the concepts intentionally by extracting the principles and
terminology from one doctrine and applying them to the other.30 For example,
given the impossibility of providing a remedy under contribution, many'courts
in no-contribution jurisdictions have expanded the traditional limitations of
indemnity in order to encompass these situations where recovery is warranted. 31
-Reasoning that contract law furnishes too narrow a basis for indemnity; courts
have recently infused principles of equity into the doctrine32 Although this
amplification of indemnity may achieve what appears to be a more desirable
result, it does so at the cost of improper applicatiorr of the law.
"The situation encountered by-the Florida court in the instant case presehts special difficulty- bedause it does not -fit neatly'into the established form
-of either -coritribution 6r indenmity~3 The problem is furthef aggravated by
.the rule- ddilying c6htibution in Fl6rida.34 Recently, the' Supremie Court of
Florida *as given the opportunity to overrule this' burdensomae obstacle to
equitable relief in Hoffman v. Jones, s5 which abrogated existing loss distribution procedures in favor of a system based on comparative negligence. Unfortunately, the court declined-to consider the issue and the no-contribution
rule has since been reaffirmed by the district courts.3 6
The instant case demonstrates the need for an equitable solution in the
situation of aggravation of injuries by a physician. Because the original tortfeasor and the physician are both dearly at fault, the -loss should be distributed.37 In Florida, however, relief through contribution is preduded,38 and
even where available the doctrine of contribution does not lend itself to this
situation because either concert of action of joint tortfeasors'or a single, in-

30. Originally, the active-passive distinction was used to determine whether the negligence of joint tortfeasors varied sufficiently in degree to warrant invoking the exception to
the no-contribution rule. These terms are now interchangeable with the primary-secondary
test, properly used in reference to the differing character of fault between indemnitor and
indemnitee. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 166 So. 2d 211 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
31. E.g., Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Il. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 80
N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
32. Mims Crane Serv., Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836, 837 (2d D.CA.*FIa. 1969).
33. 202 So. 2d at 192.

34. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So.
316 (1932); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 166 So. 2d 211 (1st D.C.A. Fla.

1964).
35. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
36. See Maybarduk v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Rader v.
Variety Children's Hosp.; 298 So. 2d 778 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1974); Issen v.Lincenberg, 293 So.
2d 777 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
. .
37.

302So. 2d at 189.

-

-

.

38. Id. at 190.
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divisible injury caused by independent acts is required for recovery. 39 In the
instant case the automobile driver and the physician acted independently at
different times,40 causing injuries that are separable and easily identifiable for
assignment of culpability. Moreover, reliance on the active-passive exception
is precluded because the injuries caused by neither party can be classified as
4
resulting from passive negligence. '
In considering the doctrine of indemnity, the court was faced with a similar
quandary. The court acknowledged that there was no contract, express or
implied, on which to base recovery because there was neither an agreement
nor a legal relationship between the parties. 42 Furthermore, as the physician
was under no duty to the car driver, no breach warranting indemnification existed. 43 Because each party caused a separate injury, his individual fault was
deemed to be primary, 44 making it improper to place the entire burden on one
tortfeasor, which is the customary method of relief under indemnity.45
Unable to determine an appropriate means of recovery within the limitations of accepted tenets, the court resorted to a modification of the principles
of indemnity. It established an equitable right to indemnity,46 basing its decision on the arguments proposed in Gertz v. Campbell,47 an Illinois case.
Factually analogous to the instant case, Gertz held that a denial of recovery
would result in an indefensible enrichment of the negligent physician and
interposed principles of equity to prevent such unjust consequences. 48 The
groundwork for this holding was laid in Herrero v. Atkinson,4 9 where a similar
dilemma was resolved under indemnity. The California court, acknowledging
that the original tortfeasor has no opportunity to control the conduct of the
physician or to protect himself against the possibility of negligent treatment of
the plaintiff's injuries, 5° determined that a right to implied indemnity existed
where required by principles of equity and good conscience. 51 The court
39. Bost v. Metcalfe, 219 N.C. 607, 610, 14 S.E.2d 648, 651 (1941). Contra, Applegate v.
Riggall, 229 Ark. 773, 318 S.W.2d 596 (1958).
40. 302 So. 2d at 188-89.
41. Id. at 192.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. E.g., Transcon Lines v. Barnes, 17 Ariz. App. 428, 498 P.2d 502 (1972); Herrero v.
Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
46. 302 So. 2d at 194.
47. 55 I1. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973).
48. Id.
49. 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
50. Id. at 75, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 493. Recognizing that California law regards the act of
the original tortfeasor as the proximate cause of damages flowing from subsequent negligent
medical care, the court nevertheless determined that doctors are separately liable for their
own negligent conduct. Id. In Hoffman v. Jones the Florida court also acknowledged the
premise that each individual should be responsible for the damage proximately caused by
his own acts. It therefore rejected the doctrine of contributory negligence, a legal fiction
comparable to that involved in the instant case. 290 So. 2d at 438.
51. Herrera v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 79, 39 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964).
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reasoned simply that "everyone is responsible for the consequences of his own
wrong.' 52 The Gertz court also relied on Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., where
the high court of New York established for the first time the right of a tortfeasor to seek partial indemnity. 54 Rejecting the active-passive distinction as
artificial and unpredictable, 55 the court favored apportionment of liability according to the relative responsibility of the parties for the loss.5 0
Although the decision in the instant case reaches a solution in accord with
sound public policy, it nonetheless represents an anomalous deviation from
established principles of law. Regardless of the fact that this situation requires
an equitable distribution of the loss that should be achieved by some other
form of contribution, 57 the court ventures to rationalize recovery through a
tortured alteration of the indemnity doctrine. Not only does this creation of
an equitable right to indemnity further obscure the distinctions between contribution and indemnity, it renders more remote the eventuality of elimination of the rule against contribution in Florida. By providing an alternate but
limited means of circumventing the no-contribution rule, and thereby diminishing the necessity to reject it entirely, the ultimate impact of this decision
will prove to be an impediment to the advancement of relief in equity.
CAROLYN A. WILSON
52. Id.
53. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 150, 282 N.E.2d at 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
56. Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
57. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
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